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UNION-NEGOTIATED LIFETIME RETIREE HEALTH
BENEFITS: PROMISE OR ILLUSION
William T. Payne and Pamina Ewing*
INTRODUCTION
Healthcare coverage looms large in the life of retirees.
Historically, many employers provided their retirees with
lifetime medical coverage - or so retirees believed. As medical
costs have dramatically increased more and more employers
have sought to reduce or terminate retiree benefits. In the
ensuing litigation, the federal courts have developed some basic
principles that control how these cases are resolved.
In the typical case, an employer modifies its program, thus
reducing benefits, shifting premium costs to retirees, or
terminating coverage altogether. Termination or significant
benefit reduction frequently occurs in connection with a plant
shutdown, a facility sale, or a strike at contract expiration. An
employer's bankruptcy or other financial pressures can also lead
to cost-cutting measures.
The number of employers reducing or terminating benefits
has been increasing since the early 1990s, when the Financial
Accounting Standards Board issued Financial Accounting
Standard ("FAS") 106.1 FAS 106 required for the first time that
companies report retiree medical benefit obligations on their
* William T. Payne and Pamina Ewing are partners with the Pittsburgh-
based firm of Stember, Feinstein, Doyle & Payne, LLC. They maintain
a nationwide practice, specializing in class action lawsuits that seek to
protect retirement benefits of employees and retirees.
1. Employers' Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions,
Fin. Accounting Standard No. 106 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. Dec. 1990).
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balance sheets, and required them to do so on the assumption
that benefits would remain unreduced and would last for the life
of the retirees. 2 To stave off the new debt on their balance
sheets, which in many cases was enormous, many employers
have responded by attempting to reduce or even eliminate their
retiree benefit obligations. Some employers have even taken the
unusual step of suing their own retirees the same day benefits
were terminated or reduced, preemptively asking the courts to
declare their modifications lawful. Most often such suits have
been followed by countersuits by retirees, sometimes in
conjunction with the unions that had represented them while
they were employed.
Much hinges on the outcome of these cases. From the
employer's perspective, cases involving just a few hundred
retirees can involve billions of dollars. For example, in recent
litigation involving General Motors, the UAW, and
approximately 500,000 retirees and spouses, a proposed
settlement requires payments by General Motors that will
probably exceed $35 billion.3
Because the United States, in contrast to Canada and many
other industrialized countries, lacks a comprehensive national
healthcare program, the annual cost of individual coverage for
retirees can be substantial and even prohibitive. Accordingly,
the outcome of litigation discussed in this article (where
employer-paid retiree coverage is at stake) can dramatically
affect retirees' lives.4 Due to preexisting medical conditions and
other factors, many retirees cannot obtain affordable alternative
coverage in the event they lose their benefits. These retirees then
must live with the prospect of a catastrophic injury or illness
depleting their life savings, if they have savings. Additionally,
2. See United Steelworkers v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 474 F.3d 271, 274 n.5
(6th Cir. 2007).
3. The authors and other attorneys from their law firm were appointed to
represent retirees in the predecessor lawsuit leading up to the current tentative GM
settlement, Int'l Union, UAW v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.3d 615 (6th Cir. 2007), and
they have been appointed as interim counsel to the class in the new proceedings.
4. E.g., Frank Swoboda, No Easy Rx for Retirees' Costly Care, WASH. POST, July
9, 1989, at C1.
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retirees without coverage may not have access to medical care
that they need.
The importance of these benefits is illustrated by the fact
that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
after years of pondering issues and considering comments,
recently issued final regulations addressing whether an
employer may, consistent with the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), terminate or reduce benefits for its
Medicare-eligible retirees while leaving them intact for younger
non-Medicare-eligible retirees without violating the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). In issuing
regulations that allow such termination or reduction for
Medicare-eligible retirees, the EEOC emphasized that its rule
concerns only the ADEA and does not affect "any non-ADEA
obligation" that employers may have to provide health benefits
under any other law (i.e., under ERISA and/or Section 301 of the
LMRA as described in this article).5
LEGAL THEORIES AND CAUSES OF ACTION
When evaluating employer efforts to cut or eliminate benefits,
courts must decide whether coverage was intended to be a
"vested" lifetime benefit, and hence not subject to unilateral
reduction, or merely "gratuitous," subject to termination at the
5. In its prior interpretation of the ADEA (which it abrogated by issuing the
new regulations), the EEOC had ruled that an employer that provided retiree health
benefits had to do so for both Medicare and non-Medicare retirees. Likewise, an
employer had to prove either that the benefits available to Medicare-eligible retirees
were the same as those provided to retirees not yet eligible for Medicare or that the
employer was expending the same costs for both groups of retirees. In abrogating
the old policy, the EEOC expressed concern about employers that are under no
legal or contractual obligation to provide benefits (having reserved a right to
terminate or reduce), and noted that its former policy "created an incentive for
employers to reduce or eliminate retiree health benefits," since employers could
avoid the "complex comparisons" required by the old rule "by simply eliminating
retiree health benefits entirely." It therefore "concluded the public interest is best
served by an ADEA policy that permits employers greater flexibility to offer these
valuable benefits." Age Discrimination in Employment Act; Retiree Health
Benefits, 72 Fed. Reg. 72938 (Dec. 26, 2007) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1625,
1627). These new regulations have survived legal challenge. AARP v. EEOC, 489
F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3510 (2008).
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will of the employer. 6 Cases turn on the parties' intent, as
manifested in the documents that govern the benefit plan. If the
governing documents are ambiguous, courts scrutinize extrinsic
evidence to determine what the parties who agreed on these
documents intended.7
An important issue in many of these cases is whether the
governing documents reserve to the employer the right to
unilaterally amend or terminate benefits. Termed "reservation
of rights" clauses, these provisions have become increasingly
common. If a union agrees to such clauses, or if the employer
unilaterally inserts them in a non-union setting, they can defeat
retiree claims for persons retiring after the clause appears.
Because federal law generally preempts state law causes of
actions in this area, private sector retirees typically sue under
federal statutes.8  All retirees, including former non-union
employees, may sue under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), which requires compliance with
"the terms of [any] employee benefit plan."9 Former union
employees also may sue under Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 ("LMRA § 301")1o, which
confers jurisdiction in suits alleging violations of labor
contracts."
Though courts vary in their degree of acceptance of these
theories, all retirees may attempt to bring the following ERISA
claims: contract claim for violation of a "plan" under ERISA §
502(a)(1)(B) and (a)(3); 12 ERISA estoppel claim; and breach of
6. See Diehl v. Twin Disc, Inc., 102 F.3d 301, 305-06 (7th Cir. 1996).
7. Id. at 305.
8. See generally Roth v. City of Glendale, 614 N.W.2d 467 (Wis. 2000) (citing
state or federal constitutional "contract clauses." as legal analysis in a public sector
retiree health dispute case).
9. See Employee Retirement Income and Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29
U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(1)(B) and 1132(a)(3) (Westlaw current through Feb. 12, 2008).
10. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185
(Westlaw current through Feb. 12, 2008).
11. E.g., Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,
404 U.S. 157, 182 n.20 (1971); Int'l Union, UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476 (6th
Cir. 1983); Weimer v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 773 F.2d 669 (6th Cir. 1985).
12. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(1)(B) and 1132(a)(3).
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fiduciary duty claim under ERISA §§ 404 and 502(a)(3)(allowing
"other appropriate relief" for such statutory claims).13 Former
union employees may also bring contract claims for breach of
labor agreement and estoppel claims under LMRA § 301.14
Because ERISA plans in the union context stem from labor
contracts, a contract breach in violation of LMRA § 301 also
constitutes a violation of plan terms actionable under ERISA.15
The ERISA and LMRA analyses accordingly overlap.
WHAT IS THE "GOVERNING DocuMENT"?
ERISA provides remedies for violation of the terms of the
plan and the terms of the documents governing the plan."
Before deciding whether "documents governing the plan" are
ambiguous, courts must determine exactly what documents are
governing. In this regard, "governing documents" need not take
any special form or be denominated as "the plan."17 The test is
not what a document calls itself but whether it in fact governs a
plan.
Thus, for example, in Delgrosso v. Spang & Co., the court
held that a collectively bargained pension agreement was the
governing plan document and invalidated a sponsor's effort to
adopt a separate "plan" that deviated from the terms of that
agreement."1 Similarly, in Halliburton Co. Benefits Comm. v.
Graves, the court held that a merger agreement that promised to
continue retiree health benefits governed, despite a provision in
13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(3).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 185.
15. See Armistead v. Vernitron Corp., 944 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (6th Cir. 1991); In
re White Farm Equip., Co., 788 F.2d 1186, 1191 (6th Cir. 1986) (even though retiree
insurance claim was brought solely under ERISA, court "look[ed] to basic contract
law"); Local 836 v. Echlin, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 697, 701-02 (E.D. Mich. 1986); Bower v.
Bunker Hill Co., 114 F.R.D. 587, 597-98 (E.D. Wash. 1986).
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(1)(B), (a)(3) and 1104(a)(1)(D).
17. Horn v. Berdon, Inc. Defined Benefit Pension Plan, 938 F.2d 125, 127 (9th
Cir. 1991).
18. Delgrosso v. Spang & Co., 769 F.2d 928, 935-36 (3d Cir. 1985); see also Horn,
938 F.2d at 127 (". . . there is no requirement that documents claimed to collectively
form the employee benefit plan be formally labeled as such.").
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the official plan document that reserved the right to reduce or
terminate benefits.'9
In Deboard v. Sunshine Mining & Refining Co.,2 0 the Tenth
Circuit concluded that employer letters sent to employees
considering early retirement constituted governing documents:
In accordance with the terms of the October 3, 1985,
letters, we conclude Woods intended to create a new
benefit plan for a specific group of employees, i.e.,
those employees who agreed to participate in the
voluntary early retirement subsidy. Although
defendants emphasize the letters opened with the
phrase "[flor informational purposes only," the
language of the letters clearly indicates an intent on the
part of Woods to provide plaintiffs with lifetime health
insurance benefits, and thereby to create a new limited
benefit plan for plaintiffs. Moreover, the
uncontroverted evidence indicates it was precisely the
lifetime guarantee of insurance benefits that induced
plaintiffs to participate in the voluntary early
retirement subsidy.21
In Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., the Sixth Circuit reached the
opposite conclusion in a ruling that addressed whether early
retirement releases contained binding plan terms that were
independent of the terms included in the formal plan
documents. 22 Some class members had signed releases that the
district court concluded could "contain GM's promise to furnish
early retirees with a particular level of health care coverage in
exchange for the early retiree's promise to, inter alia, release GM
from liability for certain causes of action." 23 The district court
ruled that these agreements may be "enforceable under ERISA
as independent bilateral contracts, or as modifications of GM's
19. Halliburton Co. Benefits Comm. v. Graves, 2004 WL 2938645 (S.D. Tex. Dec.
20, 2004).
20. Deboard v. Sunshine Mining & Refining Co., 208 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2000).
21. Id. at 1238; see also Stevenson v. Milwaukee Forge, 2006 WL 2883256 (E.D.
Wis. Aug. 17, 2006) (while employer's official plans arguably gave employer the
right to terminate or modify, the early retirement incentive program was a contract
independent from the health plans and supplanted any reservation of rights
contained therein).
22. Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 1998).
23. Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 768 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
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health care benefit plan." 24  The Sixth Circuit ultimately
reversed, ruling that oral and written statements, promises, and
representations that health care coverage would be paid in full
for life could not be considered contractually binding or effective
"amendments" to the plan. 25 The court explained that reliance
on such external promises would undermine ERISA "written
plan" requirement. 26  The court also noted that GM did not
profess or suggest that the plan was being modified and that the
representations did not constitute "ERISA plans themselves." 27
Another document that could be considered "governing" is
the "summary plan description," or SPD. 28 ERISA § 102 requires
that SPDs be written in a manner calculated to be understood by
the average plan participant, and shall be sufficiently accurate
and comprehensive to reasonably apprise such participants and
beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the plan.29 At
a minimum, the SPD must specify "the plan's requirements
respecting eligibility for participation and benefits; . . .
circumstances which may result in disqualification, ineligibility,
or denial or loss of benefits . . ."3
Many courts have held that SPDs are not only are
governing documents but that they may take precedence over
the plan itself."' Like these other courts, the Sixth Circuit also
had long held that where the SPD and plan itself are in conflict,
24. Sprague, 133 F.3d at 413 (quoting Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 843 F.
Supp. 266, 299 (E.D. Mich. 1994)).
25. Id. at 403.
26. Id. at 402-03.
27. Id. at 403; see also Steams v. NCR Corp., 297 F.3d 706, 709-710 (8th Cir. 2002)
(releases suggestive of lifetime benefits could not supersede plan document that
included a reservation of rights clause that stated that "[t]he Company reserves the
right to change or cancel the Plan, or any benefits under the Plan, at any time.").
28. Sprague, 133 F.3d at 404.
29. 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b); see also 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-3(j) (Westlaw current
through Feb. 13, 2008).
31. Burstein v. Ret. Account Plan for Employees of Allegheny Health Educ. &
Research Found., 334 F.3d 365, 378 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing decisions, and also finding
that participants need not prove reliance); Washington v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc.,
497 F.3d 453, 458-59 (5th Cir. 2007).
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the SPD will govern.3 2 This line of authority was distinguished
in the Sixth Circuit's en banc decision in Sprague,33 which held
that where an SPD stated both that benefits are lifetime and that
the employer reserves the right to change the plan, it is
unambiguous in the employer's favor, and that the reservation
controls as a matter of law.34 Further, even where the SPD
stated that benefits are lifetime at no cost to the retirees, and did
not contain reservation of rights language, the Sprague majority
held that benefits still did not vest.35 The majority viewed the
absence of any reservation language as silence on the vesting
question, and stated that "GM was not required to disclose in
the summary plan descriptions that the plaintiffs' benefits were
not vested."3 6 The majority also noted that welfare plan SPDs
are not required to inform participants about the vesting of
benefits or that the plan's benefits are subject to amendment or
termination.37 The court did not discuss the above cited
regulation that requires clear disclosure of "circumstances which
may result in the loss of benefits" that the participant may
reasonably expect on the basis of the description of benefits.38
Similarly, in Pisciotta v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., retirees argued
that booklets stating that benefits would continue "during the
lifetime of you and your spouse" were SPDs.39 The court
concluded that they were not SPDs and therefore not governing
plan documents. 40 The court then upheld summary judgment in
favor of the employer regarding the employer's "alleged
promise to pay lifetime medical benefits," stating: "No plan
32. Edwards v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 851 F.2d 134, 136 (6th Cir.
1988) ("[S]tatements in a summary plan are binding and if such statements conflict
with those in the plan itself, the summary shall govern."); Helwig v. Kelsey-Hayes
Co., 93 F.3d 243, 249 (6th Cir. 1996).
33. Sprague,133 F.3d at 400-01.
34. Id. at 401.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-3(1).
39. Pisciotta v. Teledyne Indus. Inc., 91 F.3d 1326, 1330 (9th Cir. 1996).
40. Id.
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documents exist which support such a promise." 41
Alternatively, the court found that even if the old booklets were
deemed SPDs, "the right to the lifetime payment of medical
insurance premiums did not become vested. . ."42 This was
because a disclaimer in the booklets stated that "This booklet
describes provisions of the group insurance program contained
in the contract between the company and the insurance carrier.
The contract shall be the controlling document." 43 The court
then found for employer because the contract, the controlling
document, "reserves to Teledyne the right to modify or
terminate employee welfare benefits."" This part of the Pisciotta
decision may have been discredited by the more recent
decisions. 45  Courts differ when the actual plan document is
more generous to employees than a conflicting SPD provision.
Some authorities hold that the SPD trumps the plan only if the
SPD is more generous, particularly where the SPD states that the
plan will govern. 46
Other court decisions address the issue of whether "master
agreements," insurance policies, or other documents prepared
by insurance companies should be considered controlling plan
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1331.
44. Id.
45. See Bergt v. Ret. Plan for Pilots Employed by Markair, Inc., 293 F.3d 1139,
1143-44 (9th Cir. 2002); Banuelos v. Constr. Laborers' Trust Funds for S. Cal., 382
F.3d 897, 904 (9th Cir. 2004). Compare McKnight v. S. Life & Health Ins. Co., 758 F.2d
1566, 1570-71 (11th Cir. 1985); and Hansen v. Cont'l Ins., 940 F.2d 971, 982 (5th Cir.
1991) (rejecting such clauses stating that "the plan will govern," and observing: "It
is of no effect to publish and distribute a plan summary booklet designed to
simplify and explain a voluminous and complex document, and then proclaim that
any inconsistencies will be governed by the plan. Unfairness will flow to the
employee...).
46. Compare Glocker v. W.R. Grace & Co., 974 F.2d 540, 542-43 (4th Cir.
1992)("Grace, having represented to its employees that the Plan -- not the handbook
[i.e., the SPD] -- governed questions about benefits, cannot now repudiate this
representation and rely on statements in the handbook that are less favorable to
Mrs. Glocker."); McGee v. Equicor-Equitable H.C.A. Corp., 953 F.2d 1192, 1201-02
(10th Cir. 1992); Sturges v. Hy-Vee Employee Benefit Plan, 991 F.2d 479, 480-81 (8th
Cir. 1993); Hughes v. 3M Retiree Med. Plan, 281 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding
that an SPD unfavorable to the retiree governs); Maurer v. Joy Techs., Inc., 212 F.3d
907 (6th Cir. 2000).
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documents. 4 7
AMBIGUITY OF CONTROLLING DocuMENTS
Once a court has identified the controlling documents, the
court must determine whether they are ambiguous on the
question of vesting. Courts grant judgment for retirees if the
governing documents unambiguously require continuation of
the benefits throughout retirement.4 8 If governing documents
unambiguously specify that the retiree benefits are terminable,
retirees have no right to lifetime benefits. 49
In Sprague, the Sixth Circuit similarly concluded that there
was no ambiguity in the governing plan documents, thus
justifying its refusal to consider evidence of years of
representations to retirees that benefits would be paid "at GM's
expense for your lifetime."50 Where the controlling language is
47. Helwig, 93 F.3d at 249 (holding that general termination clauses in insurance
documents did not mean the company could terminate retiree benefits, since the
clauses "were included merely to reserve the right of the employer or the carrier to
end their commercial relationship," and "even if we assume that the cancellation
clauses [of insurance company master agreements] were intended to regulate the
obligations of the employer to the employees, this Court has held quite clearly that
promises made in SPDs are binding on the employer regardless of conflicting
language in a master agreement."); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Newman-Crosby
Steel, 822 F. Supp. 862, 865 (D.R.I. 1993) (description prepared by the insurance
company "merely describe the coverage purchased by the Company to fulfill its
obligation" under the labor agreement; "[tihey cannot and do not modify that
obligation.").
48. E.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1499, 1501
(11th Cir. 1988) (agreement provided: "[Retirees and surviving spouses] shall not
have such coverage terminated or reduced (except as provided in this program) so
long as the individual remains retired from the company or receives a surviving
spouse's benefit, notwithstanding the expiration of this agreement, except as the
company and the union may agree otherwise.").
49. E.g., Musto v. Am. Gen. Corp., 861 F.2d 897, 903-06 (6th Cir. 1988) (plaintiffs
lost, since documents had informed the plaintiffs: "[Ilnsurance coverage ... may be
amended or discontinued at any time, and the Company reserves the right to
determine new premium contributions at any time," and "...since it is not possible
to foresee the future, the Company must reserve the right to change or even
discontinue these provisions if it becomes necessary," and "...the Company does, as
it always has, reserve the right to change the Plan and, if necessary, discontinue
it.").
50. Cf. Sprague, 133 F.3d at 409 (some representations quoted at dissent);
Sprague, 133 F.3d at 400-403 (majority conclusion); Int'l Union v. Skinner Engine
Co., 188 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 1999) (affirming judgment for employer on basis of
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ambiguous, courts must consider the use of extrinsic evidence to
determine the parties' true intent.51
THE "YARD-MAN INFERENCE"
In determining whether the governing documents are
ambiguous, some courts apply an inference in favor of vesting
and retirees while others apply an inference in favor of non-
vesting and employers. 52 Application of the inference can
sometimes be outcome-determinative. Because the seminal case
adopting the pro-retiree inference is Int'l Union, UAW v. Yard-
Man, Inc., this inference is termed the "Yard-Man inference."53
As to retirees, the contract at issue in Yard-Man contained the
simple promise that the Company "will provide insurance. . ."54
On summary judgment, the Sixth Circuit looked only within the
four corners of the controlling documents to rule in favor of the
retirees. 5 While the court found the phrase "will provide" to be
ambiguous, it concluded that the document as a whole
unambiguously granted lifetime benefits when this phrase was
considered in the context of the rest of the contract.5
Unremarkably, Yard-Man states that any right to lifetime
benefits must find "its genesis" in the agreement.5 7. Yard-Man
then prescribes the usual rules of contract construction.58 These
contract language alone, even though language did not say explicitly that benefits
were terminable or that benefits were "lifetime."); Joyce v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.,
171 F.3d 130, 132 (2d Cir. 1999) (same); Sengpiel v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 156 F.3d 660,
667-68 (6th Cir. 1998); Senn v. United Dominion Indus. Inc., 951 F.2d 806 (7th Cir.
1992) (finding that complete "silence" on the vesting question is unambiguous in
the employer's favor).
51. E.g., Bower v. Bunker Hill, Co., 725 F.2d 1221, 1223-24 (9th Cir. 1984);
Rossetto v. Pabst Brewing Co., Inc., 217 F.3d 539, 546 (7th Cir. 2000); Asarco, Inc., v.
United Steelworkers of Am., 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20873 (D.Ariz. July 26, 2005); Int'l
Ass'n of Machinists et al. v. Masonite Corp., 122 F.3d 228, 233 (5th Cir. 1997).
52. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d at 1476.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1480.
55. Id. at 1480, n.1.
56. Id. at 1480.
57. Id. at 1479.
58. Id. at 1479-80; see also Devlin v. Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 274 F.3d
76, 82, 84 n.4 (2d Cir. 2001) (characterizing retiree health claim under ERISA §
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rules include the common principle that courts are to interpret
each contract provision as part of the integrated whole, "so that
all of the provisions, if possible, will be given effect."59
Similarly, the ". . agreement's terms must be construed so as to
render none nugatory and avoid illusory promises."60
Under Yard-Man and traditional contract principles, courts
must determine whether the governing documents are
"ambiguous" on the vesting question.61 Only if the governing
documents are "ambiguous" will extrinsic evidence such as oral
representations be examined to determine the intent underlying
the documents. 62
The "Yard-Man inference" is based in the Sixth Circuit's
observation that a retiree benefit constitutes a kind of "status
benefit" that carries "an inference that [it] continue[s] so long as
the prerequisite status is maintained." 63  While this bare
inference does not itself establish a claim of lifetime benefits, it
serves to buttress other textual evidence of an enduring right.
The Sixth Circuit relied on two factors in support of this
part of its decision.6 4 First, the court cited the body of pre-ERISA
precedent applying the modem "contractual" view of retirement
benefits.65 Second, the court noted that under federal law,
retiree benefits are "permissive" subjects of bargaining because a
union cannot require the employer to bargain over continuing
the benefits of past retirees. 66 Accordingly, the court observed,
"it is unlikely that such benefits, which are typically understood
502(a)(1)(B), as "[e]ssentially" and assertion of a "contractual right under a benefit
plan"); Kerns v. Caterpillar, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1019 (M.D. Tenn. 2007) ("The
CBA's are contracts and, as a result, the court applies general principles of contract
law to determine whether the retiree benefits sought in this case are vested.").
59. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d at 1480.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1482.
64. Id. at 1480-82.
65. Id. E.g., Matter of Erie Lackawanna Ry. Co., 548 F.2d 621, 625-27 (6th Cir.
1977) (Ohio law before ERISA); Upholsterers' Int'l Union of N. Am. v. Am. Pad &
Textile Co., 372 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1967).
66. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d at 1480-82.
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as a form of delayed compensation or reward for past services,
would be left to the contingencies of future negotiations." 6 7 On
this point, Yard-Man cited Chem. Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass,
where the Supreme Court explained that retirees are not left
without protection because "vested retirement rights may not be
altered without the pensioner's consent." 68
While some cases have treated the Yard-Man inference as
akin to a presumption, the Sixth Circuit ruled otherwise in Int'l
Union UAW v. Cadillac Malleable Iron Co., Inc.69 As the Sixth
Circuit recently emphasized in Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline
Co.:
Yard-Man does not shift the burden of proof to the
employer, nor does it require specific anti-vesting
language before a court can find that the parties did not
intend benefits to vest. Rather, the Yard-Man inference,
and the other teachings of the opinion regarding
contract interpretation and the consideration of
extrinsic evidence, simply guide courts faced with the
task of discerning the intent of the parties from vague
or ambiguous CBAs. 70
The Sixth Circuit in Yolton expressly declined to overrule
Yard-Man:
Under Yard-Man we may infer an intent to vest from the
context and already sufficient evidence of such intent.
Absent such other evidence, we do not start our
analysis presuming anything. If Yard-Man required a
presumption, the burden of rebutting that presumption
would fall on the defendants. However, under Yard-
Man, "[tlhere is no legal presumption that benefits vest
and that the burden of proof rests on plaintiffs." This
Court has never inferred an intent to vest benefits in the
absence of either explicit contractual language or
extrinsic evidence indicating such an intent. Rather, the
inference functions more to provide a contextual
67. Id. at 1482.
68. Id. (citing Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers of Am., 404 U.S. at 181, n.20).
69. Int'l Union U.A.W. v. Cadillac Malleable Iron Co., Inc., 728 F.2d 807, 808
(6th Cir. 1984) ("there is no legal presumption based on the status of retired
employees...").
70. Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., 435 F.3d 571, 579 (6th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73 F.3d 648, 656 (6th Cir.1996)).
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understanding about the nature of labor management
negotiations over retirement benefits. That is, because
retirement health care benefits are not mandatory or
required to be included in an agreement, and because
they are "typically understood as a form of delayed
compensation or reward for past services" it is unlikely
that they would be "left to the contingencies of future
negotiations." When other contextual factors so
indicate, Yard-Man simply provides another inference
of intent. All that Yard-Man and subsequent cases
instruct is that the Court should apply ordinary
principles of contract interpretation. There is no need
to revise, reconsider, or overrule Yard-Man. (internal
citations omitted)7 1
Recently, in Noe v. PolyOne Corp.,72 the Sixth Circuit
reiterated the continuing viability of Yard-Man. Reversing entry
of summary judgment in favor of the defendant employer, the
Court indicated that it was "follow[ing] the instructions of Yard-
Man and its progeny by examining the provisions of the EBAs
and applying traditional principles of contract interpretation to
ascertain whether the parties intended to vest retiree health
benefits."73 The Court noted that "of the eleven most pertinent
Sixth Circuit cases addressing whether retiree health benefits
have vested, this court found evidence of vesting in ten." 74
As the Sixth Circuit observed in Noe, that Court "has
approached the vesting issue differently than have many of our
sister circuits,"75 Other circuits are divided on the question of
whether to accept the Yard-Man "inference" in favor of retirees.
The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits join the Sixth in applying the
inference for union retirees.76 The Ninth Circuit may also apply
71. Id. at 579-80 (citations omitted).
72. Noe v. PolyOne Corp.,-- F.3d --, 2008 WL 723769 (6th Cir. March 19, 2008)
73. Id. at *13.
74. Id. at *13 n.5.
75. Id. at *13.
76. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d at 1505 ("We fully concur with the decisions of
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in [Yard-Man and WeimerL"); Keffer v. H.
K. Porter Co., Inc., 872 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that Yard-Man
provides "a more far reaching understanding of the context in which retiree
benefits arise... [They] are typically understood as a form of delayed compensation
or reward for past services, [which would not] be left to the contingencies of future
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the inference." The First Circuit, while rejecting the notion of a
Yard-Man "presumption," seemingly does not accept or deny the
inference.78 The Second 79, Third 0, Fifth", Seventh 82, and Eighth
Circuits8 3 do not apply the Yard-Man inference.
PRESUMPTIONS OR INFERENCES USED TO DETERMINE IF
GOVERNING DOCUMENTS ARE AMBIGUOUS
Whether or not a court recognizes the Yard-Man inference
can have a determinative effect on a retiree's claims of a vested
benefit. Other presumptions, too, can dramatically impact the
assessment of whether or not the governing documents are
ambiguous. Presumptions and inferences surrounding whether
and what types of extrinsic evidence can be used, the impact of a
reservation of rights clause, the nature of vested benefits as fixed
or evolving and what qualifies as the triggering event for vesting
are all of key import when assessing a retiree medical benefits
claim.
negotiations.").
77. See Bower, 725 F.2d at 1223; Asarco, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20873 (D. Ariz.
July 26, 2005).
78. Senior v. Nstar Electric & Gas Corp., 449 F.3d 206, 217-218 (1st Cir. 2006).
79. Joyce, 171 F.3d at 135 (overturning jury verdict for retirees and granting
judgment for employer even though court acknowledged that no contract language
limited duration of benefits; court did not cite Yard-Man but cited Sprague statement
that "a commitment to vest 'is not to be inferred lightly' and ... must be found in
express language from the plan documents..."); see also Am. Fed'n of Grain Millers
v. Int'l Multifoods Corp., 116 F.3d 976, 980 n.3 (2d Cir. 1997).
80. Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d at 139 ("We reject both the appellants' invitation
to adopt the presumption enunciated in Yard-Man and their interpretation of the
relevant contract language.").
81. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Champion Int'l Corp., 908 F.2d 1252,
1261 n.12 (5th Cir. 1990); but see Masonite, Corp., 122 F.3d at 231-2 (concluding that
Champion merely "questioned the inference.").
82. Rossetto, 217 F.3d at 544. While the Seventh Circuit has adopted what it
terms a "presumption against vesting," the court emphasized that this presumption
"kicks in only if all the court has to go on is silence. If there is some positive
indication of ambiguity, something to make you scratch your head (but the
'something' must be either language in the plan or contract itself or the kind of
objective evidence that can create a latent ambiguity under principles of contract
law), the presumption falls out." The court further explained that "[tihe
presumption is thus a default rule, that is, a rule to be applied when there is no
other evidence.").
83. Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d 1512 (8th Cir. 1988).
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SHOULD EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE BE CONSIDERED?
In determining whether governing documents are
ambiguous, some courts, most notably in the Sixth Circuit, hold
that the analysis must be limited to the four corners of the
governing documents. 4 These courts do not consider extrinsic
evidence when deciding the preliminary question of whether the
documents are ambiguous. 85
In contrast, other courts making the initial determination of
ambiguity endorse what is termed the "modern view," which is
based on, for example, the common law of Pennsylvania and
California. Under this approach, courts may examine the
extrinsic evidence as part of the determination of whether the
plan or contract is ambiguous.86
TYPES OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE
Courts, then examine extrinsic evidence once the governing
documents have been determined to be ambiguous or, if the
court endorses the "modern view" to determine if the governing
documents are ambiguous. Extrinsic evidence can take a
number of forms. Documents and other materials prepared in
connection with contract negotiations are one key type of
extrinsic evidence. This can include statements, proposals, and
counterproposals from persons negotiating the controlling labor
agreements; these materials often shed light on the parties'
84. See Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d at 1479.
85. Id.
86. Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d at 142; Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc.,
967 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1992); Murphy v. Keystone Steel & Wire Co., 61 F.3d 560, 565
(7th Cir. 1995) (finding "extrinsic evidence can be used to show a contract is
ambiguous."); Mioni v. Bessemer Cement Co., 1985 WL 6551 (W.D. Pa. 1985)
("According to the practice developed under Pennsylvania law, many courts are
reluctant to hold words unambiguous without first examining the circumstances
and facts in order to determine whether any variation of the words would be an
impermissible rewriting of the contract. . .The intended meaning of even the most
explicit language can only be understood in light of the context which gave rise to
it.").
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intent.87 Pattern bargaining can also is relevant if a union
engages in pattern bargaining across an industry, evidence of
intent from bargaining sessions conducted with one employer
may aid in constructing industry-wide contracts.88
Oral or written statements to retirees is another form of
extrinsic evidence that frequently supports retirees' claims.
Company representatives often explain the nature of future
pension and insurance benefits to retirees or prospective retirees.
These explanations may be given at benefit meetings to groups
of employees, or to individual employees on the eve of
retirement, often in connection with exit interviews, and
sometimes with the participation of the employee's spouse.
When company interviewers lead retirees or perspective retirees
to believe that their benefits will be "for life," this will constitute
strong evidence supportive of vesting.89
An employer's continuation of retiree insurance during
strikes is another common type of extrinsic evidence. For union
employees, there typically is no contract in effect during periods
of strike, lockout, or plant shutdown. During such periods,
employers often terminate active employees' health insurance
but continue retiree insurance. Courts have held that
continuation of insurance during strikes is extrinsic evidence
that supports retiree claims of lifetime benefits.9 0
Extrinsic evidence can also take the form of costing analysis
prepared by employers in contemplation of plant shutdown. In
preparing for a potential plant shutdown, employers frequently
87. Int'l Union v. BVR Liquidating, Inc., 190 F.3d 768 at 771 (6th Cir. 1999)(relying
on "affidavits of the negotiators.").
88. Rossetto, 217 F.3d at 546 ("Another bit of evidence favoring the plaintiffs is
that Schlitz Brewing Company, which had a collective bargaining agreement with
the machinists' union that was identical to the agreement at issue in this case,
continues to this day to provide health insurance to the retired machinists of its
Milwaukee facilities, which it closed in 1981, Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Milwaukee
Brewery Workers' Pension Plan, 3 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 1993), after the expiration
of the agreement.").
89. BVR Liquidating Inc., 190 F.3d at 771 n.6 (retirees' "affidavits state that
company agents informed retirees that their health care benefits would be lifetime
benefits.").
90. Bower, 725 F.2d at 1225.
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"cost-out" retiree insurance on a "lifetime" basis. Notes in
conjunction with such analyses may specifically state that
benefits will continue "for life." Such evidence will support
retirees.91
Finally, cases suggest that uncontested changes or
improvements in benefits for past retirees can be highly relevant
extrinsic evidence. In Int'l Union, UAW v. Cadillac Malleable Iron
Co., Inc., the court found a lifetime benefit at full coverage-even
for those who were already retired at the time the benefit had
been created or improved:
The company argues that the extension of newly
bargained for benefits to already retired workers is
inconsistent with the conclusion that their benefits
under previous agreements were vested for life.
However, there is nothing inconsistent in granting
vested retirement benefits and then modifying those
benefits through voluntary bargaining subject to
approval by the already retired workers. Since, up
until now, the only modifications in retirement
insurance benefits have been increases in those benefits,
the retirees have never had occasion to object to the
voluntary bargaining between the union and the
company over their benefits ... If the company and the
union had previously bargained for a decrease in some
benefits paid to already retired workers, and the
retirees had agreed to the decrease without protest, this
might well be evidence that the parties, including the
retirees, did not consider those retirement benefits to be
vested. However, when only increases have occurred,
this fact does not reflect any intention that those
benefits are limited to the term of the collective
bargaining agreement under which they were
granted.92
As illustrated by this passage from Cadillac Malleable,
91. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Textron, Inc., 836 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1987);
Golden, 845 F. Supp. at 410.
92. Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am.
et al. v. Cadillac Malleable Iron Co., Inc. 1982 WL 20483 (W.D. Mich. April 28, 1982).
See also Jansen, 692 F. Supp. at 1038; Policy v. Powell Pressed Steel Co., 770 F.2d 609
(6th Cir. 1985). Compare Policy v. Powell Pressed Steel Co., 188 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2483, n.17 (N.D. Ohio, Mar. 14, 1984).
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retirees typically argue that benefit increases for those already
retired are consistent with their claim that benefits are vested,
while employers often rely on uncontested benefit reductions,
arguing that these evidence the bargaining parties' intent not to
vest.
In Laforest v. Former Clean Air Holding Co., Inc., the court
rejected the employer's argument that the retirees' union had
"tacitly" agreed to the employer's reduction of benefit levels
insofar as it did not "vigorously" contest that reduction.9 3 In
Aluminum Co. of Am., the court similarly rejected the employer's
argument that changes in the retiree medical package showed
that benefits were not vested, particularly since the only change
had been the introduction of a new optional prescription drug
mail order program.94
In several cases from Michigan, courts have held that
retirees are not "bar[red] from suing for later changes" in
benefits merely because they "tolerated earlier changes." 95
Other courts have viewed such modifications of retiree benefits
as evidence that benefits are not vested. 96
One type of "reduction" or negotiated change that has been
the subject of recent litigation are per capita caps on what
companies would spend for retiree health benefits. Caps
became more prevalent once FAS 106 began requiring
companies to report on their balance sheets the present value of
all post-retirement health benefit obligations rather than on a
pay-as-you-go basis.97  Some unions, bowing to company
pressure, have over the years agreed to set per capita caps on
93. Laforest v. Former Clean Air Holding Co. Inc., 376 F.3d 48, 51 (2d Cir. 2004).
94. Int'l Union, UAW, 932 F. Supp. at 1010.
95. Cole, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65078 at *35, and cases cited therein; Yolton, 318
F. Supp 2d at 470 n.16.
96. See, e.g., John Morrell & Co. v. United Food and Commercial Workers, 37 F.3d
1302, 1307 (8th Cir. 1994)("[T]he fact that modifications were routinely negotiated is
fundamentally inconsistent with the notion that any retirement health benefits were
ever vested."); Cherry v. Auburn Gear, Inc., 441 F.3d 476, 483 (7th Cir. 2006) ("the
parties' practice of changing the contractual terms in succeeding agreements lends
support to Auburn Gear's claim that neither party understood the benefits to be
permanent or inalterable.").
97. Fin. Accounting Standard No. 106, supra note 1.
337
MARQUETTE ELDER'S ADVISOR
these benefits, at least for future retirees.98 The Sixth Circuit
recently observed that "[b]y setting a cap on retiree healthcare
liabilities, companies safeguarded against having to report
astronomical amounts in liabilities."9 9
Unions have argued that cost caps were adopted "merely"
for "accounting purposes" and were not intended ever to be
applied.100 In a recent unpublished opinion, Wood v. Detroit
Diesel Corp., the Sixth Circuit considered the contention that an
employer had exceeded its rights by applying a FAS 106 cap.101
The court noted that, in consideration of the UAW's acceptance
of the cap agreement, the company had sent the union a letter
stating that it fully recognizes, acknowledges and hereby
confirms that retiree health care benefits for [the UAW-
represented] employees have been and will continue to be life-
time benefits and that the establishment of 'contribution limits'
in no way modifies or negates this commitment.10 2 In addition,
UAW negotiators attested in declarations to having sought and
obtained express assurances from company representatives that,
despite the agreed-to contribution limits, Detroit Diesel would
remain liable to provide lifetime health coverage and that
retirees would never have to pay out-of-pocket for the
benefits.o10
The UAW also produced a letter which was unsigned but to
which the union negotiators stated that the company had
agreed, in which the company promised that if certain VEBA
assets were insufficient to cover all above-cap premium costs,
"Detroit Diesel would make necessary adjustments to [its]
contribution level to correct this situation so that there are no out
of pocket costs for retirees." 0 Given this extrinsic evidence, the
Sixth Circuit concluded that "there are unresolved questions of
98. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 474 F.3d at 274.
99. Id. at 274 n.5.
100. Wood v. Detroit Diesel Corp., 213 Fed. Appx. 463 (6th Cir. 2007).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 468.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 469.
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fact going to the matter of vesting." 05
The court held that the plaintiffs had "some likelihood" of
success on the merits - although "[i]t may not be a 'strong'
likelihood and "plaintiffs may have difficulty ultimately
prevailing on the merits of their claims."1 o6
Another piece of extrinsic evidence may be the summary
plan description. As discussed above, in some circuits, the
description of benefits contained in an SPD can, in effect, be
treated as binding terms of the plan. 07 Even if a court does not
consider SPD representations to be binding, the failure to
comply with SPD requirements may still be extrinsic evidence
supporting the retirees' interpretation of the plan."0 s For
example, assume the employer claims that retiree benefits were
always meant to terminate on plant shutdown, but the plan itself
is ambiguous and the SPD fails to disclose shutdown as a
"circumstance" which could result in benefit termination. The
employer's failure to make the ERISA-mandated disclosure
105. Id. at 471.
106. Id. See also the district court ruling in Yolton, 318 F. Supp 2d at 473, which
was not appealed as to this point, where the court stated that, "[alt this time, the
court is not convinced that the FAS-106 letter was merely for accounting purposes
and that the UAW and Case therefore did not intend for it to limit Case's
obligations to provide future retirees' health care benefits."; and later Yolton
decision finding that the caps were not meant to shift costs to retirees, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17622 *16 ("the evidence demonstrated that the UAW and Case did not
intend for the caps in those letter to ever have a substantive effect on retirees and
their surviving spouses, but was imposed for accounting purposes only."; see also
Reese v. CNH Global, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63670 * 30 (E.D. Mich. 2007) ("Cap Letters
[were meant] to serve only as an accommodation whereby the UAW agreed to
allow Case to temporarily reduce the figure for its estimated future costs for retiree
medical benefits on its financial records," and citing testimony that "the
understanding of Case and the UAW was that the cap never would be reached
because its effective date would be moved and therefore retirees and their
surviving spouses never would be required to contribute to the cost of their health
care benefits"); see also Trull, 329 F. Supp 2d at 665-66, 673-75 (denying summary
judgment to employer, and holding that there were factual disputes as to whether
the company had acted within its rights in applying a FAS-106 cap, since there was
strong extrinsic evidence that the company had promised both that it would
increase the cap and that the cap would have no application in the event of a plant
closing).
107. E.g., Edwards, 851 F.2d at 136 ("[S]tatements in a summary plan are binding
and if such statements conflict with those in the plan itself, the summary shall
govern.").
108. Id.
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suggests that the employer never intended such a disqualifying
condition.109 This analysis is supported by the principle that
where a duty to record or publish certain matters exists, the non-
existence of the record evidences the converse proposition.110
RESERVATION OF RIGHTS CLAUSES
Some courts view "reservation of rights" clauses skeptically,
and have readily found them to be ambiguous.11' Other courts
construe such clauses as granting employers unfettered power to
reduce or terminate benefits.'12
On the threshold question of ambiguity, union retirees have
a distinct advantage over non-union retirees. Because unions
are not likely to agree to reservation of rights clauses,
collectively bargained language will rarely grant such a right.
Some courts have held that a unilaterally drafted document
cannot affect vested rights created by the bargained-for
document." 3 Thus, in Masonite the negotiated labor agreement
stated that retirees would have health benefits "until. .
.death."114 The employer nonetheless relied upon a unilaterally
drafted "reservation-of-rights" clause in its "ERISA Plan
document," which purported to give the company the rights to
terminate benefits "at any time," i.e., even before the death of
the retiree." 5 The Fifth Circuit ruled that "a reservation-of-
109. Bower, 725 F.2d at 1224. See generally STEPHEN R. BRUCE, PENSION CLAIMS
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 598-600 (2d ed. 1993).
110. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 1633 at 624 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974); see also U.S.
v. Scales, 594 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1979).
111. McCoy v. Meridian Automotive Sys., Inc., 390 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2004)
(finding that "the SPD language on which Meridian relies is not the [type of]
unqualified reservation-of-rights language that would fairly prompt a union to
protest." Where the clause in question- "The Plan may be amended at any time and
in any manner by [Rockwell/Cambridge]. While [Rockwell/Cambridge] intends to
continue the plan indefinitely, it reserves the right to terminate all or part of the
Plan at any time, and cancel all or part of the coverage and benefits under the Plan.
Any such action would be taken only after careful consideration and subject to the
provisions of any applicable collective bargaining agreement.").
112. See Musto, 861 F.2d at 903-05.
113. Masonite Corp., 122 F.3d at 232.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 233.
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rights clause in a plan document . .. cannot vitiate contractually
vested or bargained-for rights. To conclude otherwise would
allow the company to take away bargained-for rights
unilaterally. 116 In contrast to the courts in cases like Masonite, the
Sixth Circuit in Maurer held that benefits could be cut for
persons retiring after the employer inserted "reservation of
rights" language in the plan documents, reasoning that the
union should have filed a grievance upon seeing the language.117
However, Maurer was later limited by McCoy v. Meridian, which
ruled that "the SPD language on which Meridian relies is not the
[type of] unqualified reservation-of-rights language that would
fairly prompt a union to protest"11 8 , and Prater v. Ohio Educ.
Ass'n, which explained that "a broad reading of [Maurer] would
run headlong into the rule that a plan summary 'cannot vitiate
contractually vested or bargained-for-rights."' 119 Also significant
in the union setting is Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers of Am. v.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. 120 In its central holding in this case, the
Supreme Court ruled that unions are not the bargaining
representative of retirees once they retire. 121 This implies that
even if a union purports to agree to decrease benefits for past
retirees, that agreement is ineffective because the union does not
represent retirees.122 Maurer addresses this issue by concluding
that negotiated cuts are only enforceable as to future retirees, not
as to persons who have already retired. 123
116. Id. at 233; see also Gilbert v. Doehler-Jarvis, Inc., 87 F. Supp 2d 788, 794 (ND
Ohio 2000) ("...this Court will not countenance a rule that could permit a company
to unilaterally take away contractually bargained-for rights.. .The reservation of
rights clause in the SPD does not provide probative evidence of an intent to end
retiree health care benefits at the termination of the CBA."); Asarco, Inc., 2005 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 20873.
117. Maurer, 212 F.3d at 919.
118. McCoy, 390 F.3d at 424.
119. Prater v. Ohio Educ. Ass'n, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 23103 (6th Cir. Oct. 3,
2007) (citing Halliburton Co. Benefits Comm., 2004 WL 2938645.).
120. Allied Chemical & Alkali Wokers of Am., 404 U.S. at 179, 181 n.20.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See generally Maurer, 212 F.3d at 907; see also Yolton, 318 F. Supp 2d at 473
("Defendants also argue that an injunction should not extend to those employees
who retired after October 3, 1993, the date the FAS-106 Letter became effective and
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At first, appellate decisions did not explicitly state that
standards for union retirees differ from standards for non-union
retirees. Indeed, in In re White Farm, the Sixth Circuit declared
that even though the retiree insurance claim was brought by
non-union retirees solely under ERISA, the court must "look to
basic contract law," and it "must, in this case as in Yard-Man and
the other collective bargaining agreement cases, interpret the
contract's terms."'24 The court went on to note that "courts may
draw inferences or make presumptions as this court has done in
construing collective bargaining agreements providing welfare
benefit plans."125
More recently, in ruling that summary judgment should be
entered in favor of union retirees, the Sixth Circuit specifically
held that there is a dual standard. In Int'l Union v. BVR
Liquidating, Inc.,126 the Court held that Sprague and Sengpiel v. B.
F. Goodrich Co.,1 27 another case involving salaried employees,
were "distinguishable" because the court there was confronted
with a benefit plan unilaterally instituted by the company:
In this case, the benefit plan was negotiated between
the company and the union. The Yard-Man
presumption was specifically intended to apply in the
context of a collective bargaining agreement. The Yard-
Man court noted that '[b]enefits for retirees are only
permissive not mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining. As such, it is unlikely that such benefits,
which are typically understood as a form of delayed
compensation or reward for past services, would be left
thus arguably capped Case's retiree health insurance obligations. At this time, the
Court is not convinced that the FAS-106 Letter was merely for accounting purposes
and that the UAW and Case therefore did not intend for it to limit Case's
obligations to provide future retirees' health care benefits. Thus employees who
elected to retire after that date are not entitled to a preliminary injunction.
However the Court finds this alleged 'cap' ineffective with respect to employees
who chose to retire prior to October 3, even if their retirement went into effect after
that date, and with respect to employees who elected a Voluntary Lay-Off option
prior to the FAS-106 Letter's effective date, but who only 'grew into' retirement
after that date.").
124. In re White Farm Equipment Co., 788 F. 2d. at 1191.
125. Id. at 1193.
126. BVR Liquidating, Inc., 190 F.3d at 768.
127. Sengpiel, 156 F.3d at 660.
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to the contingencies of future negotiations.128
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE VESTED BENEFIT?
It is unsettled whether certain changes such as a change to
managed care, or shifting costs to retirees while simultaneously
adding benefits, infringe upon vested benefits.129 Courts parse
the language of the governing plan documents to decide this
issue. 130
In an unusual decision, the Seventh Circuit recently ruled
that, even absent specific language suggesting that a lifetime
benefit must be an "evolving" benefit, the Court should allow it
to evolve. 131 In Zielinski v. Pabst Brewing Co., Inc., the court
found for retirees and concluded that it should "fill in gaps" and
create a program that was reasonably commensurate with one in
effect in 1981.132 The court explained:
In sum, the benefits to which the plaintiff class is
entitled are those specified in the shutdown agreement
but adjusted-to the extent possible without wild
conjecture- for changes to which the parties to the
agreement would have agreed had they focused at the
outset on the duration of the commitment made by the
employers. The district judge will want to pay
particular attention to the pharmaceutical-benefits
packages that employees in the brewing industry
negotiate through their unions today, as the brewers'
union did lo these many years ago. Those packages
should approximate, at least roughly, the value of the
1971 Blue Cross-Blue Shield plan updated to 2004.133
In the most recent in a series of decisions in Yolton v. El Paso
128. BVR Liquidating, Inc., 190 F.3d at 773.
129. See Diehl, 102 F.3d at 310-11; Int'l Union, UAW, 932 F. Supp. at 1008-10.
130. See Deboard, 208 F.3d at 1243 ("We conclude plaintiffs are entitled to the
same type of coverage, at defendants' expense, as provided to defendants' current
salaried employees. If defendants were to change coverage for their current
employers, such changes would also affect plaintiffs. Defendants could not,
however, place plaintiffs in a low-cost insurance plan while simultaneously
providing a higher level of service and benefits to their current employees.").
131. Zielinski v. Pabst Brewing Co., Inc., 463 F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 2006).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 621.
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Tennesee Pipeline, the Court distinguished Zielinski and refused to
allow the defendants to make so-called "administrative
changes" that would have had the effect of imposing more costs
on the retirees. The Court observed that in Zielinski:
the relevant labor agreements did not provide the
details (i.e. the specific levels and types) of the
plaintiffs' health insurance coverage. Instead, those
details only were outlined in the insurance provider's
[old] plan brochure . .. Where specific levels and types
of coverage have been negotiated and agreed to (i.e.
contracted for), as was done by Case and the UAW, this
Court does not believe that changes to those levels
and/or types of benefits can be imposed unilaterally by
El Paso or the courts.13
In an earlier decision, the Yolton court had observed that the
agreements at issue appeared to mean that the retirement
package available to someone contemplating retirement will
change with the expiration and adoption of collective bargaining
agreements ("CBA"), but someone already retired under a
particular CBA continues to receive the benefits provided
therein despite the expiration of the agreement itself.'35
The court added that "[t]his is perhaps where the Yard-Man
inference makes the most sense," because, in the court's view, it
would not make sense for retiree benefits to be "alterable based
on the changing whims and relative bargaining power of their
former union and employer."1 36
In Weimer v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc., the court construed the plan
documents "to limit the level of benefits of a retiree's insurance
coverage to that provided by the group policy in effect when he
or she retired."137 Similarly, in In re Ormet Corp., the court
concluded that "[t]he rights and benefits for. . .past retirees were
what those employees had bargained for under the health
134. Yolton v. El Paso Tennesee Pipeline, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17622 (E.D. Mich,
March 7, 2008).
135. Yolton, 435 F.3d at 581 (emphasis added).
136. Id. at 581 n.6.
137. Weimer, 773 F.2d at 674.
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benefits for retirees included in the group health insurance plan
in effect at the time they retired." 38 However, the decision in
Weimer was based on specific plan language, 139 and the decision
in Ormet was based on testimony as to the negotiators' intent.140
In Int'l Union, UAW v. Cadillac Malleable Iron Co., Inc., the court
found a lifetime benefit at full coverage even for those who were
already retired at the time the benefit had been created or
improved.141
It also is unsettled whether benefits become "vested" when
participants attain retirement eligibility, or whether participants
actually have to retire for vesting to take place.142 In Devlin v.
Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, the Second Circuit addresses this
issue, holding that where the "unilateral contract" theory
applies, the benefit is "earned" even after "part performance."143
Accordingly, implementation of a new reservation of rights
clause cannot cut off the rights of those who had not yet
retired.144
OTHER RULES FOR CONSTRUING GOVERNING DOCUMENTS
Ambiguity of the controlling document with respect to
138. In re Ormet Corp., 324 B.R. 646, 654 (S.D. Ohio 2005).
139. Weimer, 773 F.2d at 674.
140. In re Ormet Corp., 324 B.R. at 654; see also John Morrell & Co., 37 F.3d at 1307
("there is no basis for concluding that later modifications to a retiree's initial level of
health benefits are vested."); Angotti v. Rexam, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42104 at
*42 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2006) (plaintiffs were "likely to succeed on the merits of their
Labor Management Relations Act claim that they have a vested entitlement to the
health benefits that they received when they retired," but plaintiffs had not shown
"that they likely enjoyed vested rights to all of the benefits they were receiving as of
December, 2005.").
141. Cadillac Malleable Iron Co., Inc., 728 F2d at 809; see also Jansen v. Greyhound
Corp., 692 F. Supp. 1029, 1038 (N.D. Iowa 1987) (The court reasoned that active
employees gave up something in later negotiations to benefit retirees; this bargain
provided the necessary consideration.).
142. See Terrell v. Dura Mechanical Components Inc., 934 F. Supp. 874, 879-882
(N.D. Ohio 1996) (concluding benefit is vested upon attaining retirement eligibility;
furthermore, employees gave up the vested benefits through release in a shutdown
agreement); Int'l Union, UAW v. Park-Ohio Indus., Inc., 661 F. Supp. 1281, 1310
(N.D. Ohio 1987)
143. Devlin, 274 F.3d at 84-85 n. 4-6.
144. Id.
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vesting can be a pivotal issue for retirees seeking enforcement of
what they believed to be lifetime healthcare benefits.
Ambiguity, however, is not the only issue impacting the court's
interpretation of the documents governing medical benefits.
Rules and presumptions surrounding clauses which specify the
duration of benefits, link retiree medical benefits to pension
eligibility, specify the relationship between the medical benefit
and Medicare eligibility, and indicate that the benefit is "for life"
can strongly impact the success of retirees' claims.
GENERAL DURATION CLAUSES
The Sixth Circuit declared in Yard-Man that a non-specific
general clause such as a general duration clause cannot "take
precedence" over a more specific clause such as one promising
benefits during retirement. 145 Many courts have addressed this
issue.
In Yard-Man, the Sixth Circuit stated that "the inclusion of
specific durational limitations in other provisions. . .[e.g.,
provisions concerning disabled or laid-off employees] suggests
that retiree benefits, not so specifically limited, were intended to
survive. . ."146
Courts consider it significant that governing documents link
retiree medical benefits to pension eligibility. The court in Kerns
v. Caterpillar, Inc. summarizes the leading cases:
Significantly, this language links retiree and surviving
spouses medical benefits to pension eligibility. The
Sixth Circuit has held that this constitutes strong
evidence of vesting. For example, in Yolton, a 2006 case,
the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding
that the plaintiffs' benefits had vested, explaining that. .
145. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d at 1483.
146. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d at 1481-82. See also Yolton, 435 F.3d at 581-82;
Maurer, 212 F.3d at 918; Cole v. Arvinmeritor, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65078, slip
op. at 30-32 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 2006); Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp., 873 F. Supp. at
1100; Int'l Union, UAW v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 932 F. Supp. 997, 1006 (N.D. Ohio
1996); Shultz v. Teledyne, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 289, 292 (W.D. Pa. 1987).
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.the district court interpreted the language of the
agreement and found evidence that the defendants
intended to confer lifetime benefits upon the plaintiffs.
Of particular significance to the district court was
language in the Group Insurance Plan that tied benefits
to the pension plans. . .Because the pension plan is a
lifetime plan and the health insurance benefits are tied
to the pension plan, the district court found that the
health insurance benefits were vested and intended to
be lifetime benefits. 14 7
In Golden, similar language in each of the CBA's tied retiree
benefits and surviving spouse eligibility for health insurance
coverage to eligibility for vested pension benefits. The Sixth
Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that, "[s]ince retirees
are eligible to receive pension benefits for life . . . the parties
intended that the company provide lifetime health benefits as
well."1 48
Similarly, in McCoy v. Meridian Auto. Sys., Inc., the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the retiree
plaintiffs had established a likelihood of success on the merits of
their claim. After finding that the collective bargaining
agreement in that case incorporated a supplemental agreement,
the Court held, "Because the Supplemental Agreement ties
eligibility for retirement-health benefits to eligibility for a
pension, in other words, there is little room for debate that the
retirees' health benefits vested upon retirement under Golden. . ."
(because ... the governing contract ties retiree health benefits to
pension status, it "constitutes an enforceable contractual
promise of lifetime retiree health benefits to accompany lifetime
pension benefits.") (internal citations omitted).149
In Noe v. PolyOne Corp., the Sixth Circuit again reiterated the
tying principle, explaining that "language in an agreement that
ties eligibility for retiree health benefits to eligibility for a
147. Kerns, 499 F. Supp. 2d at 1021 (citing Yolton, 435 F.3d at 580).
148. Id. (citing Golden, 73 F.3d at 656).
149. Kerns, 499 F. Supp. 2d at 1021-22 (citing McCoy v. Meridian Automotive
Sys., Inc., 390 F.3d 417, 426 (6th Cir. 2004)).
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pension indicates an intent to vest the health benefits." so
Health plans often provide benefits to Medicare-eligible
individuals, such as reimbursement of Medicare Part B
premiums, which differ from the benefits provided to
individuals who are not yet eligible for Medicare. Some courts
have found plan language concerning such post-Medicare
benefits as supporting an inference of vesting, on the theory that
such provisions suggest that benefits will continue to be
provided over an expanse of years.15' Those cases reason that if
benefits could be terminated at any time, or upon expiration of
any CBA, provisions regarding benefits to be provided at age 65
would be "illusory."152
Courts disagree about plan documents which state that
benefits are "for life" while including a general reservation of a
right to terminate. The Sixth Circuit in Sprague holds that such
documents are unambiguous in the employer's favor'. Other
courts disagree.'5"
ESTOPPEL
Even where the plan itself unambiguously precludes an
award of lifetime benefits, retirees may argue that employer
misrepresentations give rise to a promissory estoppel or
equitable estoppel claim. The alleged misrepresentations
usually are in the form of oral statements or statements in an
SPD.155
150. Noe v. PolyOne Corp., 2008 WL 723769 at *8.
151. See e.g., Maurer, 212 F.3d at 918; Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d at 1481; Pirelli
Armstrong Tire Corp., 873 F. Supp. at 1100.
152. Id.; but see Senior, 449 F.3d at 219 (language that "defines the level of benefits
a retiree may receive at a certain age... [was not] language regarding the duration of
the [promise].").
153. Sprague, 133 F.3d at 401.
154. Barker v. Ceridian Corp., 122 F.3d 628, 635 (8th Cir. 1997).
155. In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Medical Benefits Litigation, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1577 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2003); Jones v. Am. Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co., 213 F.R.D.
689 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 13, 2002); In re Sears Retiree Group Life Ins. Litig., 198 F.R.D. 487,
489 (N.D. Ill. 2000); Hancock v. Delta Air Lines Inc., 793 F. Supp. 366 (D. Maine
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Generally, to prevail under estoppel principles, plaintiffs
need to show that the defendant made a material
misrepresentation upon which plaintiffs reasonably relied to
their detriment. Following these principles, courts deny relief
under the estoppel theory where plaintiffs fail to show
reasonable reliance, particularly where the plaintiffs knew of the
actual plan provision which contradicted the misrepresentation.
For a retiree health case where the court concludes that the
unambiguous reservation of rights clauses in the SPD made it
impossible for retirees to prove "reasonable" reliance.15
As noted above, however, in Edwards v. State Farm,157 the
Sixth Circuit held that proof of reliance is unnecessary where the
misrepresentation appears in an SPD. In contrast with Edwards,
some decisions apply the traditional requirements of promissory
estoppel with respect to SPD misrepresentations. 15  As noted,
the Sixth Circuit in Sprague, distinguishes (and probably limits)
the reach of Edwards in retiree health benefit cases-at least in
the Sixth Circuit.159
Promissory estoppel can be argued under both LMRA § 301
and ERISA, but there is a split in the authorities as to ERISA. 16 0
1992); Frahm v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 137 F.3d 955, 957 (7th
Cir. 1998); Walther v. Pension Plan for Salaried Employees of the Dayton-Walther
Corp., 880 F. Supp. 1170, 1178 (S.D. Ohio 1994); Sprague, 133 F.3d at 398-99 (having a
viable misrepresentation claim, sounding in either estoppel or fiduciary breach,
may present problems for plaintiffs at the class certification stage, since a court
could hold that the requisite "commonality" is absent due to the many different
types of representations.).
156. See In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Medical Benefit "ERISA" Litigation, 58 F.3d
896, 908 (3d Cir. 1995). See also Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d at 152 ("there is
absolutely no evidence in this record that shows that any of the appellants
considered the promise of lifetime health and life insurance benefits in timing their
retirements.").
157. Edwards, 851 F.2d at 137.
158. E.g., Anderson, 836 F.2d at 1520 (requiring showing of reliance on SPD
misrepresentation); Lee v. Union Electric Co., 789 F.2d 1303, 1308 (8th Cir. 1986).
159. Sprague, 133 F.3d at 388.
160. For promissory estoppel cases decided under LMRA § 301, see, e.g.,
Armistead, 944 F.2d at 1298-1300; Pirelli Armstrong Tire, Corp., 873 F. Supp at 1102
(finding viable estoppel claim); Hass v. Darigold Dairy Prod. Co., 751 F.2d 1096,
1099-1100 (9th Cir. 1985); Apponi v. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 809 F.2d 1210, 1217 (6th
Cir. 1987) ("The equitable doctrine of estoppel ... [is] applicable in a section 301
action to enforce a labor contract."); Acri v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 781 F.2d 1393,
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Some decisions allow estoppel claims only where a statement is
an "oral interpretation" of an ambiguous ERISA plan.161 In Marx
v. Loral Corp., retirees asserted an estoppel claim on the theory
that company representatives had informed them that, if they
remained with a sold division, their retiree welfare benefits with
would be equal to or better than they had been before.'6 2
Despite the representations, the employer later reduced
plaintiffs' benefits.'6 3 Based on Kane and Greany, the retirees
lost.'4 Holdings of cases like Kane and Greany greatly diminish
the usefulness of the estoppel doctrine for plaintiffs because, if
the plan is ambiguous, the plaintiff can use representations as
extrinsic evidence of intent without having to prove reliance and
other elements of an estoppel claim.
In its en banc decision in Sprague, the Sixth Circuit seems to
accept the reasoning of cases like Kane and Greany, thus limiting
what seemed to be its acceptance of traditional estoppel
principles in Armistead.'65 The court explained: "[p]rinciples of
estoppel ... cannot be applied to vary the terms of unambiguous
plan documents . .. [but] can only be invoked in the context of
ambiguous plan provisions."' 66 This is so for two reasons: First,
"reliance can seldom, if ever, be reasonable or justifiable if it is
inconsistent with the clear and unambiguous terms of plan
documents available to or furnished to the party." 6 7 Second, "to
allow estoppel to override the clear terms of plan documents
would be to enforce something other than the plan documents
themselves [and] [t]hat would not be consistent with ERISA."68
1397 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The equitable doctrine of estoppel is ... not preempted by
section 301."); Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. U.S. Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264
(6th Cir. 1980). For cases under ERISA recognizing estoppel as a viable theory, see
Devlin, 274 F.3d at 85-86.
161. Kane v. Aetna Life Ins., 893 F.2d 1283, 1286 n.4 (11th Cir. 1990); Greany v.
Western Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 973 F.2d 812, 821 (9th Cir. 1992).
162. Marx v. Loral Corp., 87 F.3d 1049, 1051 (9th Cir. 1996).
163. Id. at 1052.
164. Id. at 1056.
165. Sprague, 133 F.3d at 404.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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Others cases seem to completely prohibit estoppel under
ERISA. 16 9 These cases generally cite ERISA's requirement that a
plan be in writing as evidence of Congressional intent to
disfavor relief based on oral or written representations.o70
FIDUCIARY CLAIM
In addition to claims asserting a violation of the plan and
estoppel, some claimants can raise a breach a fiduciary duty
claim. Proving a breach of the duty to administer the plan
according to its terms or refrain from making misrepresentations
can afford retirees redress that might not otherwise be available.
BREACH OF DuTY To ADMINISTER THE PLAN "IN ACCORDANCE
WITH IT'S TERMS"
Section 404(a)(1) of ERISA states a fiduciary's duties include
the duty to administer the plan "in accordance with its terms."17 1
Accordingly, a fiduciary's refusal to provide benefits in
accordance with plan terms (e.g., a term which required
coverage throughout retirement) would also appear to constitute
a fiduciary breach for which a fiduciary is personally liable.172
This provision would be most useful for plaintiffs who seek to
recover from an individual or parent corporation not signatory
to the contract. In this sense, the fiduciary theory would be an
alternative to the "corporate veil" theory discussed in
Steelworkers v. Connors Steel, and Keffer v. H.K. Porter Co., Inc. '7
However, many decisions now hold that an employer-
fiduciary may remove its "fiduciary hat" and put on its
"employer hat" before making the decision to "amend or
169. Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 488, 490, 492-93 (2d Cir. 1988);
Straub v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 851 F.2d 1262, 1265 (10th Cir. 1988).
170. See also Am. Fed'n of Grain v. Int'l Multifoods Corp., 116 F.3d 976, 980 (2nd
Cir. 1997). But see Devlin, 274 F.3d at 85-86.
171. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
172. 29 U.S.C. § 1109.
173. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d at 1499; Keffer, 872 F.2d at 60.
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terminate" benefits. 74 Under these cases, deciding and acting to
amend or terminate the plan are not "fiduciary" functions, and
cannot amount to a breach of fiduciary duty.'75
Employers may find additional support for this defense in
Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, which states that "[e]mployers or other
plan sponsors are generally free under ERISA, for any reason at
any time, to adopt, modify, or terminate welfare plans" and that
they do not act as fiduciaries in those situations. 76
However, even if there is no fiduciary breach when an
employer amends or terminates a plan, and even if amendment
or termination of benefits in a particular case would otherwise
be proper, the amendment or termination may still be invalid if
the plan contains no amendment procedure or if the employer
fails to properly follow this procedure. 77
BREACH OF DUTY TO REFRAIN FROM MAKING
MISREPRESENTATIONS
An independent fiduciary breach claim could attack the
very same misrepresentations which also serve as extrinsic
evidence of the parties' intent, or as the basis for a promissory
174. See Jansen, 692 F. Supp. at 1038-39; Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d at 1508
(affirming on the "alter ego" theory and expressly declining to rule on the
independent fiduciary theory); Keffer v. Connors Steel, 1998 WL 152022 (S.D. W.Va.
Apr. 19, 1988); Joyce v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 810 F. Supp. 67, 73 (W.D.N.Y. 1992);
DelGrosso, 769 F.2d at 934-36; Hazel v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 1990 WL 482125 (S.D.
Ind. May 15, 1990) (defendant exercising significant control over the signatory
employer may bear fiduciary liability under ERISA and may be liable for tortious
interference with contract under LMRA § 301).
175. Musto, 861 F.2d at 911-12. See also Senn, 951 F.2d at 817; United
Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp., 961 F.2d 1384, 1386 (8th Cir.
1992); Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp., 873 F. Supp. at 1101.
176. Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 582, 890 (1996). But see Masonite, Corp.,
122 F.3d at 228 n.4 (suggesting that "whether an employer, which also acts as plan
sponsor, has breached its fiduciary duty, depends on whether the benefits with
which it interfered were vested.").
177. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 84-85 (1995); Algie v.
RCA Global Commc'ns, Inc., 60 F.3d 956 (2d Cir. 1995) (seller's failure to formally
terminate its severance pay plan before sale resulted in severance pay being paid
under seller's plan). See also Voyk v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 198 F.3d
599, 603-04 (6th Cir. 1999) (failure to specify specific amount of contribution
imposed on retirees does not violate Schoonejongen).
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estoppel claim. The retiree health case In re Unisys is
instructive.1 78 The Third Circuit concluded that plan language
unambiguously reserved for the employer a right to reduce or
terminate retiree health benefits, and the court therefore rejected
retirees' claim that the employer breached the terms of the
plan.179 The retirees also alleged, however, that the employer
had breached fiduciary duties by misrepresenting that benefits
were "for life" when in fact the plan language made benefits
terminable.180 The court held that a fiduciary's duty to inform
"entails not only a negative duty not to misinform, but also an
affirmative duty to inform when the trustee knows that silence
might be harmful."' 8 ' The court concluded that the retirees'
complaint stated a claim and it remanded the case for trial.182
The Supreme Court endorsed the reasoning of Unisys in
Varity Corp. v. Howe.183 There, the plaintiffs alleged that they had
been induced to leave the old employer's retiree health plan
because of that employer's misrepresentations about the
financial condition of the new corporation.'" When the new
corporation went bankrupt and they plaintiffs were left without
retiree health benefits (benefits they would have had if the
employer's misrepresentations had not induced them to leave),
they brought an ERISA suit against the old employer.185 The
Supreme Court held that employers have a fiduciary duty not to
make misrepresentations to participants, that an employer acts
in a fiduciary capacity in making such representations, and that
there is a remedy available to individuals who are the victims of
such misrepresentations.' 86  The Court added that ERISA
178. In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Medical Benefits Litigation, 57 F.3d 1255 (3rd Cir.
1995).
179. Id. at 1263.
180. Id. at 1264.
181. Id. at 1202.
182. The class in Unisys was later decertified due to variations in the
circumstances of the many class members. In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits
Litig., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1577 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2003).
183. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1069.
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502(a)(3) gave the former employees a right to "appropriate
equitable relief . .. to redress" the harm that this deception had
caused them individually.18 7 Among other remedies the Court
considered to be "appropriate equitable relief" was an order that
the defendant reinstate the former employees into its own plan
(which had continued to provide benefits to those retiring from
defendant's profitable divisions).' 5
The original panel decision in Sprague also cited Varity as an
alternative ground for upholding judgment for plaintiffs. 189
However, the en banc decision reversed on this and other points,
explaining that GM's explanations of its retirement program
were not a breach of fiduciary duty under Varity when "GM
never told the early retirees that their health care benefits were
vested upon retirement" but told them that their coverage was
to be paid by GM for their lifetimes.190 The Sixth Circuit further
found that GM did not breach its fiduciary duties by failing to
"tell the early retirees at every possible opportunity, that which
it had told them many times before-namely, that the terms of
the plan were subject to change," explaining there is "a world of
difference between the employer's deliberate misleading of
employees in Varity Corp. and GM's failure to begin every
communication to plan participants with a caveat."' 9 ' ERISA's
fiduciary duties do not require disclosure of information that
"ERISA's detailed disclosure provisions [for SPDs] do not
require to be disclosed"; "[w]e are not aware of any court of
appeals decision imposing fiduciary liability for a failure to
disclose information that is not required to be disclosed").192
187. Id.
188. Id.; see also Devlin, 274 F.3d at 86-90. Retirees however, may have difficulty
recovery money damages in a claim for breach of fiduciary duty - which must be
brought under ERISA § 502(a)(3). See, e.g., LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assoc. Inc.,
458 F.3d 359, 363 (4th Cir. 2006).
189. Sprague v. General Motors Corp., 92 F.3d 1425, 1442 (6th Cir. 1996).
190. Sprague, 133 F.3d, at 404-5.
191. Id. at 405.
192. Id.; see also Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d at 150 (rejecting fiduciary claim and
stating: "The problem with this contention is that there is no competent evidence
which suggests that the company made any affirmative misrepresentations
concerning the duration of retiree benefits. At best, the evidence indicates that
354 [Vol. 9
2008] RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS: ILLUSION?
Sprague, however, was distinguished in James v. Pirelli
Armstrong Tire Corp., where the Sixth Circuit reversed a district
court finding that the employer had not breached its duty by
making misrepresentations about retiree health benefits, noting:
Sprague does not stand for the proposition that a
reservation of rights provision in a SPD necessarily
insulates an employer from its fiduciary duty to
provide "complete and accurate information" when
that employer on its own initiative provides inaccurate
and misleading information about the future benefits of
a plan. Indeed, Sprague explicitly allows for a breach of
fiduciary duty claim under such a circumstance. Were
it otherwise, an employer or plan administrator could
provide, on its own initiative, false or inaccurate
information about the future benefits of a plan without
breaching its fiduciary duty under ERISA, simply
because of the existence of a reservation of rights
provision in the plan. However, this would be contrary
to the basic concept of a fiduciary duty, which "entails
not only a negative duty not to misinform, but also an
affirmative duty to inform when the trustee knows that
silence might be harmful." 19 3
CONCLUSION AND COMMENTARY
The authors of this article have represented retirees in many
retiree health benefit lawsuits, and they have seen first-hand the
hardship that elimination or reduction of benefits can cause
retirees. The authors therefore tend to view the issues from the
retirees' point of view. Nevertheless, they have attempted in
this article to describe the law objectively in a "nuts and bolts"
format, and hope they have succeeded.
That said, the authors do note that they strongly disagree
with those court decisions that create a presumption against
vesting. The authors believe such decisions more often than not
there may have been an historical assumption, perhaps by both sides that
retirement benefits would be for life.").
193. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp., 305 F.3d at 454-55.
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defeat legitimate expectations of retirees and undermine the
contracting parties' intent. Moreover, the courts that have
employed the anti-retiree presumption typically do it on the
basis of faulty premises.
For example, some of these courts focus on the fact that, in
enacting ERISA in 1974, Congress mandated complex vesting
rules only as to pensions and it exempted retiree health benefits
plans from these vesting requirements. 194 While some courts
infer from this a presumption that retiree health benefits are not
vested,195 the better view is that no such inference can be drawn.
Indeed, as other courts have observed, the fact that ERISA does
not require that health benefits vest does not mean that the
parties cannot by agreement or "private design" make these
benefits vested. 196 This is particularly true when one considers
that, while ERISA wholly preempts state law relating to
employee benefit plans, it was not designed to leave plan
participants worse off than they were under pre-ERISA state
law.197  And under pre-ERISA precedent that interpreted
employer promises to provide retirement benefits that no statute
required to be vested, there was never a presumption against
vesting; indeed, there was more often a presumption in favor of
vesting. 198
Another faulty premise of some court decisions applying an
194. 29 U.S.C. § 1101.
195. E.g., Gable v. Sweetheart Cup Co., Inc., 35 F.3d 851, 857-58, 860 (4th Cir.
1994).
196. E.g., Maurer, 212 F.3d at 917; Golden, 73 F.3d at 655; In re White Farm Equip.
Co., 788 F.2d at 1192; Masonite, Corp., 122 F.3d at 233.
197. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1114; Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987); see
also Smith v. CMTA-IAM Pension Trust, 746 F.2d 587, 589 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[t]he
underlying purposes of ERISA are to protect the interests of participants in
employee benefit plans."); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 114
(1989) (rejecting an interpretation of ERISA's enforcement provisions that "would
afford less protection to employees and their beneficiaries than they enjoyed before
ERISA was enacted.").
198. E.g., Upholsterers' Int'l Union of N. Am., 372 F.2d at 428 ("[Wle deal here with
an employee benefit provision which vests when the employee service called for is
fully performed."); BENJAMIN AARON, LEGAL STATUS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RIGHTS
UNDER PRIVATE PENSION PLANS 10 (Richard D. Irwin, Inc. 1961); Pension Plans and
the Rights of the Retired Worker, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 909, 916-919 (1970).
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anti-retiree presumption is their assumption that an employer
would have been extremely wary of this "huge" liability at the
time the benefit was created and the original language
negotiated, so that an employer's commitment to vest benefits
should "not to be inferred lightly." 19 9 What these cases ignore is
that, when the unions and companies first negotiated the
benefits (usually in the 1970s or earlier), they were extremely
inexpensive. That the employer may not have anticipated that
costs would escalate is at best an "unforeseen circumstance,"
which-in a contract case-cannot relieve a party from its
obligation. In other words, it is wrong for these courts to let the
size of today's health care burden on employers guide their
interpretation of contract language negotiated more than thirty
years ago. Worse still, many of these decisions look to today's
enormous costs as a justification for applying this anti-retiree
"default rule," while at the same time ignoring strong extrinsic
evidence of the parties' shared intent thirty years ago that
benefits were vested.
The error of such court decisions led a concurring judge in
one circuit opinion to observe:
Before about 1980, I seriously doubt that it occurred to
many employers to grant retiree health benefits on
anything less than a lifetime basis. The
overwhelmingly prevalent trend of labor contracts was
to continue or improve retiree benefits from contract to
contract. It was only in the eighties, with spiraling
medical costs, heightened foreign competition,
epidemic corporate takeovers and the declining
bargaining power of labor, that thought was first given
to reducing retiree benefits from contract to contract or
even (though this seems more implausible) to
eliminating such benefits entirely. I think that, at least
before the eighties were in full swing, prevailing
conditions suggested a presumption among unions and
management alike that retiree health benefits vested
unless there was agreement to the contrary. Hence, I
would lean toward [adopting an inference in favor of
vesting]-the position adopted by the Sixth Circuit in
199. Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d at 139.
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the seminal case, Int'l Union, United Auto, etc. v. Yard-
Man, Inc." 200
200. Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603, 613-14 (7th Cir. 1993) (internal
citations omitted). See also Keffer v. H.K. Porter Co., (citing Yard-Man as "consistent
with a more far-reaching understanding of the context in which retiree benefits
arise."); Local Union No. 150-A, United Food & Commercial Workers, etc. v.
Dubuque Packing Co., (concluding that benefits vested because "there is simply no
evidence that the Company and the Union did not intend to vest the right to
benefits in the retirees".)
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